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Abstract
Learning sequential actions is an essential human ability, for
most daily activities are sequential. We modify the serial reac-
tion time (SRT) task, originally used to teach people a con-
sistent sequence of button presses by cueing them with the
next target response, to record mouse movements, collecting
continuous response trajectories. Further, we introduce a rein-
forcement learning version of the paradigm in which the next
target is not cued. Instead, learners must explore response al-
ternatives, and receive a penalty for each incorrect response,
as well as a reward for a correct response. Participants are
not told that they are to learn a single deterministic sequence
of responses, nor that it will repeat (nor how often), nor how
long it is. Given the difficulty of the task, it is unsurprising
that some learners performed poorly. However, many learn-
ers performed remarkably well, and some acquired the full 10-
item sequence within 10 repetitions. We compare the high- and
low-performers’ detailed results in this reinforcement learning
(RL) task with a cued trajectory SRT task, finding both simi-
larities and discrepancies. Finally, we note that humans in this
task outperform three standard RL models and have different
patterns of errors that suggest future modeling directions.
Keywords: Sequence learning; serial reaction time task; se-
quential action; reinforcement learning; movement trajectory
Introduction
Traditionally, the bulk of cognitive psychology studies deal
with single stimulus-response actions or decisions. How-
ever, much of human behavior can better be described as se-
quential action, consisting of partially-ordered hierarchies of
simple actions–from cooking and cleaning to speaking and
sports. More recently, several diverse lines of research have
considered sequential action learning, stemming from various
domains including linguistics (Elman, 1990; Saffran, New-
port, & Aslin, 1996), implicit learning (Nissen & Bullemer,
1987; Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991), and everyday ac-
tions (Cooper & Shallice, 2000; Botvinick & Plaut, 2004).
Throughout these lines of research, a recurring topic of in-
terest has been the process by which action-sequences are
acquired, stored, and executed. Early work by Nissen and
Bullemer (1987) focused on the modulatory role of attention,
and introduced the Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task. Un-
beknownst to the participants, the task utilized a 10-symbol
sequence, with each successive symbol indicating which of
four corresponding keys was to be pressed next. Participants
showed improved reaction times across training, although the
knowledge gains seemed to be implicit: when explicitly asked
at the end of the experiment, they were unable to reproduce
the sequence. Nissen and Bullemer (1987) concluded that at-
tention is critical in developing awareness of learned behav-
ior. The role of attention in the SRT task was further stud-
ied in Fu, Fu, and Dienes (2008), finding that reward moti-
vation can improve the development of awareness of the se-
quence. Fu et al. (2008) reasoned reward motivation regulates
the amount of attention paid to the stimuli, which in turn fa-
cilitates sequence learning.
Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) demonstrated that as-
sociative processes could account for the improvement in
performance. They adapted the SRT paradigm to include
a sequence derived from a ‘noisy’ finite-state grammar, and
showed that the presence of grammatical structure facilitates
sequence acquisition. Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) ex-
plained their findings with a simulation of the learning pro-
cess. A Simple Recurrent Network (SRN; Elman (1990))
was able to produce results similar to human performance,
findings that were later confirmed by Boyer, Destrebecqz,
and Cleeremans (2005). The SRN demonstrates that asso-
ciative processes are sensitive to the statistical structure of the
training material, implying that rule-like behavior can emerge
from networks trained on structured sequences. Indeed,
Botvinick and Plaut (2004) showed that the SRN is capable of
producing everyday hierarchical actions such as coffee- and
tea-making after training on a set of valid examples that var-
ied in order and complexity (e.g., sugar then milk or vice-
versa, or only milk). Motivated by a study (Stadler, 1995)
showing that introducing a longer delay (2000 ms instead of
400 ms) to a random selection of the response-stimulus in-
tervals reduced sequence learning, Dominey (1998) proposed
another recurrent network model that is able to account for
both serial structure effects and temporal structure (i.e., pat-
terns of delays).
To better reveal the mechanisms behind human sequen-
tial action learning, more information is needed than just the
speedup of keypresses across an experiment. To measure
real-time dynamics and uncertainty during learning, the SRT
task was adapted to require and record movement trajecto-
ries in (Kachergis, Berends, de Kleijn, & Hommel, 2014b,
2014a). That is, instead of measuring discrete button-presses,
continuous recordings were made during a mouse tracking
task that replaced the original SRT’s buttons with locations
on a computer screen. The trajectory SRT paradigm not only
replicated earlier findings, but also found evidence of sequen-
tial context effects (e.g., predictive movements towards the
next response location), and unveiled changes in the move-
ment dynamics (e.g., pre- and post-stimulus onset).
Paradigms such as artificial language learning tasks and the
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SRT task have demonstrated that sequence learning is depen-
dent upon the statistical structure within the training mate-
rial, and attention towards the stimuli which is modulated by
reward motivation. However, rewards do not only provide a
source of motivation: in many situations they are an irreplace-
able source of information–perhaps even the only feedback.
Contrary to the SRT task, everyday human action learning is
often not characterized by cued responses but by exploring
the environment and learning which actions result in positive
effects, and which result in negative effects. We believe that,
in order to investigate human sequence learning in an eco-
logically valid manner, it is necessary to draw in another line
of research: reinforcement learning (RL), a well-established
paradigm in the field of machine learning (Sutton & Barto,
1998), which of course was originally motivated by much
earlier behaviorist stimulus-response learning studies (e.g.,
Skinner (1950). RL paradigms allow learning agents to in-
teract with a task solely through observations, actions, and
rewards. The rewards validate the actions, without the need
for explicit cueing or other forms of instruction. Thus, learn-
ing is exploratory, and accomplished via trial-and-error.
Although much reinforcement learning research is con-
ducted in computer simulation, the inspiration for the ap-
proach and many algorithms is in fact rooted in animal be-
havior (Sutton & Barto, 1998) and there is evidence that
similar processes play a role in human learning. For in-
stance, the error-related negativity (ERN) event-related po-
tential (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991;
Gehring, 1992) has been studied extensively as a component
of error processing. The ERN originates in the brain when-
ever task-relevant errors are committed. Holroyd and Coles
(2002) links the ERN to the mesencephalic dopamine system,
and proposes it is the result of a negative reinforcement signal
which it conveys to the anterior cingulate cortex.
The current study adapts the trajectory SRT task to allow
for free movement and limited instruction, allowing learners
to explore and learn from trial-and-error. This RL sequence
learning paradigm allows us to study the effect of rewards on
sequence acquisition in more detail, yielding not only correct
response times but also mistakes over time, which may be
indicators of distinct mechanisms. For example, committing
an error indicates incomplete knowledge (or a lapse in mem-
ory), whereas RT may be correlated with overall certainty or
fluency at that point in the action sequence. Thus, we investi-
gate the RL paradigm data both in terms of earlier trajectory
SRT data and in comparison to three standard RL models.
Experiment
The goal of the current study is to examine sequence learning
within the trajectory SRT paradigm, and to compare human
performance to basic baseline reinforcement learning mod-
els. The trajectory SRT task was adapted to no longer cue
participants with the next target position, forcing them to in-
stead explore the response alternatives until the correct one
was found. Moving the mouse cursor from the previous tar-
get to another response alternative resulted in a reward (+1) or
penalty (-1) that was accumulated throughout the experiment
and displayed continuously. Upon reaching a valid target, it
would change color to green, add to the score by +1, and al-
low the participant to continue exploring. Reaching for an in-
valid target caused it to change to red, subtract from the score
by 1, while the cursor was relocated to the previously oc-
cupied target, effectively resetting the participant’s progress.
Target validity was determined by a recurrent sequence, taken
from the Nissen and Bullemer (1987) study, and adapted to
fit the trajectory SRT paradigm. Designating the stimuli as
numbers from left to right, top to bottom, the sequence read
4-2-3-1-3-2-4-3-2-1.
Methods
Participants Participants in this experiment were 13 Lei-
den University students and employees (age: M = 23.9, sd =
6.4) who participated in exchange for 3.5 euros or for course
credit.
Procedure Participants were instructed that they would be
presented with four target squares in the corners of the screen
which they were to explore by moving the mouse, each time
resulting in either a gain or loss of one point. Participants
were told to try to maximize their score, which was displayed
continuously at the top of the screen. Unbeknownst to the
participants, only one of the four targets would be valid at
any given moment, but all were colored blue, so the target
could not be visually distinguished. Upon reaching a valid
target, its color would change to green momentarily and the
score would increase by one. The participant would be able
to continue exploring for the next target. Arriving at an in-
valid target caused it to change to red momentarily and the
score was decreased by one, while the cursor was relocated
to the previously occupied target. Thus, although there were
no instructions explicitly indicating it, participants likely in-
ferred that they had chosen the incorrect stimulus, and should
choose one of the remaining two–if they also assumed the
same target was never repeated immediately, which was true.
In the absence of a previous target (i.e., at the beginning of
the experiment or after a rest break) the cursor was moved
back to the middle of the screen.
Unbeknownst to the participants, each trial consisted of
a series of 10 targets (labeled 1-4 left-to-right and top-
to-bottom: 4-2-3-1-3-2-4-3-2-1) that repeated continuously,
with no indication where one trial stopped and the next be-
gan. Participants completed eight blocks of 10 such trials,
with a short rest break after every 2 blocks (i.e., 200 cor-
rect movements). A participant who somehow knew the se-
quence before entering the experiment and never made a mis-
take would therefore make 800 movements to valid targets,
receiving a theoretical maximum of 800 points. At worst, a
participant with no memory of even the previous target they
had tried may make an infinite number of mistakes, and may
never finish the experiment. Assuming enough memory to not
repeat the same invalid target more than once when seeking
each target (i.e., an elimination strategy), a participant using
this elimination strategy would expect on average to score 0
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points, as the expected value of completing one movement
successfully is 0.1 Note that participants were not told that
there was a single deterministic sequence, let alone details
such as how long the sequence was.
Results
The data from all 13 participants were analyzed. Figure 1
shows a histogram of the final score achieved by each par-
ticipant. The distribution of scores is non-normal (Shapiro-
Wilk’s W = 0.87, p < .05), instead looking bimodal, with
four participants collecting less than 300 points and all but
one of the rest accumulating more than 500 points each.
Given the bimodal score distribution, a median split was used
to divide the participants into high-performing (≥ 526; 7
people) and low-performing (< 526; 6 people) groups. In
the high-scoring group, participants achieved almost flawless
performance after only approximately 30 trials, with a final
mean score of 652 (max: 725), while the low-scoring group
only gradually increased their score (final mean score: 287).
The remaining analyses are carried out for each group in an
attempt to understand the great variability in performance—
and the impressive success of the high-scoring group.
Figure 1: The histogram of
participants’ final scores after
completing 80 sequence rep-
etitions (800 targets) shows
a bimodal distribution (lines:
elimination strategy EV=0;
perfect knowledge EV=800).
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Response Times The overall median response time (RT)
for all stimulus arrivals was 1,401 ms (sd: 4,980). Of 10,400
correct target arrival times (median: 1,078 ms, sd: 2,216),
317 (3%) were trimmed for being too slow (median + 2 · sd).
Of the 4,117 incorrect stimulus arrival times (median: 2,397
ms, sd: 8,401), 100 were trimmed for being too slow (2.4%).
Each subject’s median RT for correct and incorrect move-
ments was computed for each 10-trial block. Figure 2 shows
the mean of subjects’ median correct and incorrect RTs over
the experiment, split into high- and low-performing group.
RTs for correct movements improve in both groups during the
first few blocks, but the high-scoring group speeds up more
than the low-scoring group. Figure 2 also shows that the rare
incorrect RTs for the high-performing group get slower over
the course of the experiment, whereas the low-performing
group’s incorrect RTs only increase a bit. The strikingly slow
mistakes of high-performing participants, compared to mis-
takes that are barely slower than correct movements for the
low performers may indicate a different mode of behavior. A
133% of chance success in one try (+1), 33% chance of success in
two tries (-1+1), and 33% chance of success in three tries (-1-1+1).
possible explanation is that low performers are simply not try-
ing to learn a sequence, or do not expect it to to be determin-
istic, whereas high performers explicitly learn the sequence,
and when they are uncertain they must pause to try to recall
the next target.
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Figure 2: The mean of subjects’ median correct RTs by block (left
panel) shows that high-performers’ RTs improved more than the
low-performers’ RTs over training. The mean of subjects’ me-
dian incorrect RTs by block (right panel) shows that the high-
performing group’s incorrect RTs actually increased, whereas the
low-performing group’s stayed roughly the same across the experi-
ment. Error bars show +/-1SE.
Accuracy The mean number of mistakes made over the
entire experiment was 19.8 (sd: 21.3) for the high-scoring
group, and 63.5 (sd: 11.9) for the low-scoring group. Over
time, the number of mistakes decreased especially for the
high scoring group. Examining the mistakes made by each
group of participants according to where they were in the se-
quence revealed that for both groups the fifth stimulus was
particularly challenging. This is reflected in the mean num-
ber of mistakes for each group (see Figure 4, as well as in the
mean RT to the target by sequence position (see Figure 3).
Comparison to previous research The pattern we observe
in the accuracy and response time data bears some resem-
blance to the pattern observed in a previous trajectory SRT
study that used cues (Kachergis et al., 2014b). Although the
task in this study (RL) was fundamentally different from the
previous study (cued SRT), the same sequence was used in
both experiments which enables us to compare the scaled re-
sponse times from the former and the accuracy from high- and
low-performers in the latter experiment. Shown in Figure 5,
we see a similar pattern across experiments, and the over-
all mistakes per position in the RL experiment and the cor-
rect RTs in the cued experiment are significantly correlated
(r = 0.64, t(8)=2.36, p< .05), with detailed comparisons be-
low. We also compared the data to the Simple Condensator
Model (SCM) proposed by Boyer et al. (2005), which imple-
ments a negative recency bias: expectation (activation) for ev-
ery response builds at each step until a given response occurs,
195
●● ●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sequential Position
M
ea
n 
of
 M
ed
ian
 R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Group
● High
Low
Figure 3: Mean of subjects’ median correct response times by me-
dian split and sequential position. The correct RTs for the two
performance groups were not significantly correlated (r = 0.17,
t(8)=0.48, p = 0.65). Low-scorers were slowest at position 5, fol-
lowed by 2 and 8, whereas high-scorers were worst at position 1,
and almost consistently fast besides that. Error bars reflect +/-1SE.
and activation resets. Thus, stimuli that have been used least
recently have highest activation—and fastest RTs. The SCM
has previously been shown to correspond closely to human
cued SRT responses, and Figure 5 shows it mirrors mistakes
in both groups of the RL experiment quite well.
We examined mistakes and correct response times by their
sequential position, and compared these to RTs from the pre-
vious cued SRT study. Overall, there is a significant correla-
tion (r = .88, t(8)=5.37, p< .001) between correct RTs from
the RL study and RTs from the cued SRT study. Comparing
the cued RTs to the high- and low-scoring groups separately
revealed a difference between the groups. The cued SRT RTs
do not correlate significantly with the high-scoring group’s
RTs (r = .51, t(8)=1.68, p = .13), but do correlate signifi-
cantly with the number of mistakes made in the RL study
(r = .83, t(8)=4.18, p < .01). The low-scoring group shows
the opposite pattern. The cued SRT RTs correlated signifi-
cantly with the RL correct RTs (r = .80, t(8)=3.79, p < .01)
but not with the RL mistakes (r = .57, t(8)=1.96, p = .09).
Comparing the two groups with each other revealed a signifi-
cant correlation in mistakes (r = .79, t(8)=3.68, p< .01), but
no significant correlation in RT (r = .17, t(8)=0.48, p> .05).
The SCM was strongly correlated with the low-scoring RL
group’s RTs (r= .93, t(8) = 6.93, p< .001), but not with the
high-scoring RL group’s RTs (r = .16, t(8) = 0.45, p= .67).
The low-scorers, failing to discern the repeating sequence,
may have mostly used a negative recency bias. The SCM was
correlated with the mistakes of both RL groups (low: r= .89,
t(8) = 5.52, p< .001; high: r = .74, t(8) = 3.12, p= .01).
Models of sequence learning To compare human sequence
acquisition with existing reinforcement learning models, we
implemented the models using PyBrain (Schaul et al., 2010;
see Figure 6 for an overview of the modeling experiment’s
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Figure 4: The mean number of mistakes made per block by position
in the sequence split by performance group. The errors are highly
correlated (r=.79, t(8)=3.68, p< .01), though note how much worse
sequence position 5 was for the low-performing group relative to
the next-worst position (8). Low-performers showed twice as many
errors in position 5 as in 8, while the high-performing group showed
only a 25% increase in errors. Error bars reflect +/-1SE.
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Figure 5: Scaled mean number of mistakes in the current experiment
against scaled correct RTs from a cued SRT study Kachergis et al.
(2014b) by sequence position. Error bars show +/-1SE.
setup). The environment contains all data regarding the tar-
gets, which it passes to the task, which in turn passes the cur-
rent state of the environment to the agent, which selects the
relevant action. The action is evaluated by the environment,
which updates itself and passes a reward to the agent. The
reward is used to update the agent’s strategy, and the model
continues with the next step. We defined the reinforcement
learning SRT task in this framework for our simulations.
As in the human experiment, the data regarding the targets
was only partially-visible to the agent. The task acted as a
veil through which a certain state would be observable. To a
human participant, the current position in the sequence would
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Figure 6: Overview of the experimental setup for the RL models.
Each plated component is a PyBrain class, which interact with each
other according to the arrows to simulate the same trial-and-error
learning process that humans undergo.
be obvious, as it was colored differently from the other stim-
uli. At a minimum, the immediately prior occupied position
was probably obvious as well, readily available in memory.
Positions preceding that, however, might not be reliably ac-
cessible in memory. In the sequence we used (4231324321),
following (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), each position’s iden-
tity is fully determined by the previous two positions. That
is, one could perfectly predict the next position given only
the two prior to it–assuming one has determined that there
is a deterministic, periodically-repeating sequence. The RL
models we use rely on a set of third-order observations, as-
suming that the models know their current position and the
two prior positions.
The models differ in their learning component, which is
contained within the agent and maintains a mapping be-
tween states and action-values. For each given input-state
there are three action-values, corresponding to the number
of movements that can be made by the agent. Upon re-
ceiving a reward, the agent updates the action-values using
its learning algorithm. We tested three learning algorithms:
SARSA (Rummery & Niranjan, 1994), standard Q-learning,
and Q(λ)–Q-learning with eligibility traces (Watkins, 1989).
Q-learning is an off-policy algorithm, learning about the
greedy policy, updating old action-values using the maximum
of all action-values for the current state, while it stochastically
selects actions, sometimes exploring. SARSA is on-policy:
instead of the maximum, it also takes into account the ac-
tion it has selected for the current state. The eligibility traces
in Q(λ) are temporary records of an event (e.g., an action or
state) that help with temporal credit assignment by adding a
trace to events that are eligible for learning updates. Theoret-
ically, eligibility traces link RL temporal difference methods
(like Q-learning and SARSA) to Monte Carlo methods.
These algorithms were chosen as simple baselines that dif-
fer somewhat in exploratory behavior and learning speed, and
thus may be suitable to compare to human behavior which
varied widely. As with the human participants, the simu-
lated SARSA and Q-learners were tasked with iterating over
the repeated sequence until the successful completion of 800
movements. For each model, a grid search over the parame-
ters (learning rate α and discounting factor for future rewards
γ) was used to find optimal values.
The best parameters found for the SARSA model (α= .01,
γ = .98) achieved a mean final score of 200 (sd=218). The
best parameters found for Q-learning (α = .38, γ = .98)
yielded a mean final score of 290 (sd=116), while Q(λ)
reached a mean final score of 451 (sd=34, parameters: α =
.001, γ= .95, λ= .99). However, despite considerable learn-
ing by the end of the experiment, none of the models per-
formed as well as the high-performing human learners, who
averaged a final score of 652. Even the maximum scores
achieved by the models were below the high-scoring hu-
mans average or maximum (human= 725; Q-learning= 518,
Q(λ)=557; SARSA= 546).
Although these common RL models were unable to reach
human-level performance, we thought it worthwhile to exam-
ine whether their error patterns resemble those of people. The
mistakes made by the SARSA and Q-learning algorithms did
not vary much by sequence position, and while Q(λ) made
more mistakes in the middle of the sequence (vaguely like hu-
mans), none of the models’ error patterns were significantly
correlated with humans.
Discussion
We adapted the trajectory SRT paradigm to be a reinforce-
ment learning task. The task proved to be more challeng-
ing for some than for others, as indicated by a bimodal dis-
tribution of scores, and differences in the high- and low-
performing groups’ response times (RTs) and mistakes by se-
quence position. These data may suggest that participants
adopt different strategies, discussed in greater detail below.
Overall, the findings of the reinforcement learning paradigm
are similar to a previous trajectory SRT experiment with cued
targets: RT and accuracy were correlated across experiments.
In particular, data from the high-performing participants com-
pared remarkably well to the previous trajectory SRT study,
despite the task differences. The most notable similarity was
the difficulty participants experienced with the fifth stimulus
position.
The better-performing half of participants made very few
errors after as little as 10 repetitions of the length 10 se-
quence. Block-by-block analysis of the RTs by performance
group showed a difference in speed-up across the experi-
ment: the high-performing group already made faster correct
responses in the second block of ten repetitions, and main-
tained this advantage. The difference in response times to
incorrect targets suggests the two groups might have used
different strategies. The rare but increasingly-slow mistakes
in the high-performing group may indicate retrieval attempts
and an awareness of their uncertainty as to the next step.
In contrast, the persistent and relatively fast mistakes of the
low-performing group suggest these participants may have
adopted a probabilistic view of the task, randomly trying op-
tions instead of trying to learn a deterministic pattern. This
was corroborated by the particular success of the parameter-
free Simple Condensator Model (SCM) in matching the low-
scoring group’s RTs using a simple negative recency bias. A
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distinction of stimulus-based and plan-based control (Tubau,
Hommel, & Lo´pez-Moliner, 2007) may capture the apparent
differences between the low- and high-performing groups.
The results by sequence position showed that participants
in both groups had more trouble with the target in sequence
position five than any other target. This is similar to the pat-
tern observed in previous studies (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987;
Kachergis et al., 2014b), and has previously been taken to
indicate that participants chunk the sequence into two parts:
the initial 4-2-3-1 and the final 4-3-2-1, with positions 5 and
6 bridging the two chunks. We note that the only repeated
transition in the sequence (3-2, at positions 6 and 9)–which
might be expected to be worse due to the higher transition
probability–shows neither slow correct responses nor more
mistakes for either position it occurs in, somewhat unlike
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Models make the clearest predic-
tions, but in the absence of a winning theory, a comparison to
other paradigms can also be illuminating.
Despite the major difference of no cueing of the next re-
sponse, performance in the RL experiment was quite compa-
rable to performance in the cued SRT study. The correlations
of mistakes and RTs by sequence position indicated a differ-
ence between the low- and high-performing groups that was
not immediately obvious. Overall, the cued SRT response
times are correlated to RTs and accuracy in the RL exper-
iment, whereas this is not true for both the low- and high-
performing groups separately. The low-scoring group closely
matched the negative recency bias of the SCM (in mistakes,
but especially in RT), but the pattern and strategy of the high-
scoring group is less clear.
Hoping to better understand especially the high-
performing group, we developed a simple reinforcement
learning model and tested three different learning algo-
rithms. High-performing humans were still far better than
the models, which on average scored roughly as well as
the low-performing humans. SARSA had quite variable
performance, but was lowest on average, while Q-learning
with eligibility traces fared the best. Examining the models’
performance by sequence position showed they did not
correspond well with errors in either group of humans. This
suggests that simple model-free reinforcement algorithms
do not capture the process by which humans learn action
sequences, even though they eventually converge on a proper
solution. One explanation for this is the fact that the task
and models used in studies like this do not fully capture the
essence of human action learning, which is goal-directed by
nature. Future studies could shed light on the role of goals in
the acquisition of such action sequences, as has been shown
to exist for single-step action (see, for example, Hommel,
Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001) for one proposed
mechanism of goal-directed action). The process by which
humans acquire action sequences is subtle, can yield quite
variable performance, and is not easily captured by simple
learning algorithms. However, studying it is important, as
most of human behavior is essentially sequential in nature.
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